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The uses and abuses of the past: cultural rhetoric 
and the unmaking of a moral universe
It is well established ethnographically that history is a particularly important and celebrat-
ed aspect of Icelandic identity. Paraphrasing Hastrup, it could be argued that Icelandic cul-
ture is a culture of the past. The collapse in Iceland in 2008 problematised this valorisation 
of history. In this paper we draw on Carrithers’ ideas of cultural rhetoric to analyse how 
Icelanders made sense of the collapse particularly in relation to their understanding of 
their own history. Following Johnson, we look at the play of agency, intention and respon-
sibility evident in the accounts offered for the collapse. Through that we seek to highlight 
how these accounts, even when highly critical of Icelandic political and cultural practices, 
tend to allow for and even encourage the on-going identification with the nation-form. 
Key words: history, culture, rhetoric, nation-form, identification
Introduction
Iceland’s threat to default on its debt to Britain should surprise no one. Icelanders 
are, by nature, intrinsically unreasonable. It is part of their charm and the secret of 
their survival. If the founders of that unique nation – Norwegians, escaping from 
medieval tyranny, with their Irish and Scottish slaves and women they kidnapped 
during their flight – had made a rational appraisal of their prospects, they would 
not have settled on a giant lump of lava in the cold ocean just south of the Arctic 
Circle. The national genetic records are precise. The men and women who want to 
repudiate the obligation to repay the loan are directly descended from the heroes 
of the sagas. When those marauding old Norsemen found that they had mistaken 
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16 Sigurjón B. Hafsteinsson, Tinna Grétarsdóttir, Arnar Árnason
Venice for Constantinople, they sacked it anyway because sacking was their busi-
ness. Their progeny are not going to feel many qualms about keeping £3.6 billion 
of somebody else’s money. 
Thus Roy Hattersley, former minister and deputy leader of the British Labour 
Party, arguably better known now as his Spitting Image, writing in “The Times” on 
January the 8th 2010. Mr Hattersley was writing on the issue of the Icesave debt: 
money allegedly owed by the Icelandic government to the British because the lat-
ter had paid out guarantee on the accounts of British customers of an Icelandic 
bank that the Icelandic government should, again allegedly, rightly have been re-
sponsible for. According to Mr Hattersley, Icelanders seem an unusual nation. 
They are also the products of their background – in one sentence their genetic 
make-up, in the next their history. It is only with reference to this background 
that Icelanders and their current actions can be understood. At the same time that 
is an adequate and sufficient context to make sense of those actions. The sacking 
carried out by ‘old Norsemen’ 1000 years ago explains the refusal of contemporary 
Icelanders to pay the debt incurred by the activities of a private, if legally Icelan-
dic, bank. 
In an interview published early in 2013 in the Icelandic newspaper DV, Vigdís 
Hauksdóttir, a member of Parliament for the Progressive Party (Icelandic: Fram-
sóknarflokkur), claimed that her party’s past was irrelevant to its present and its 
future. Pushed by the journalist to acknowledge the party’s complicity in the ‘cor-
ruption’ allegedly widespread in the country in the decades running up to the 
economic collapse in 2008 – the collapse that brought the Icesave debt along with 
many other things in its wake – Vigdís answered that the party is only ever its 
members at any given time. The people who were there before the collapse of 
2008, hrunið as it is usually simply referred to in Icelandic, have gone and new 
people have taken over. The alleged corruption has nothing to do with the people 
now running the party, the parliamentarian said. The past is immaterial, of no 
consequence. Commenting on the interview a few days later, the editor of the 
paper insisted on the importance of analysing, understanding and remembering 
the history of Iceland, specifically in the years leading up to the collapse. Forget-
ting the past would be to invite disaster again. History provided a lesson and the 
means to locate responsibility. 
These little episodes, in and of themselves of no particular consequence, serve 
to highlight the issues we seek to address in this paper. What is at stake when 
people remember or forget their collective history, their cultural traditions (see 
Árnason et al. 2003)? What is at issue when the celebration of history is a marked 
cultural tradition but that history suddenly becomes problematic, not something 
to celebrate? How does engagement with history speak to the distinction between 
inside and outside, important in the context of Iceland specifically (Hastrup 1998) 
but surely more generally too, internal forces and external influences and the dis-Th
is 
co
py
 is
for
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly 
- d
ist
rib
uti
on
 pr
oh
ibi
ted
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Th
is
 c
op
y 
is 
fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
- d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d.
   
   
 - 
   
   
Th
is 
co
py
 is
 fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
- d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d.
   
   
 - 
   
   
Th
is 
co
py
 is
 fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
- d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d.
   
   
 - 
   
   
Th
is 
co
py
 is
 fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
- d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d.
   
   
 - 
   
   
17The uses and abuses of the past: cultural rhetoric and the unmaking…
tribution of agency that is imagined in such formulations? How is the celebration 
of history evoked in and linked to the attribution of cultural agency? 
The context in which we seek to address these questions is Iceland after the 
banking collapse of the autumn of 2008. Our specific interest is how history has 
been mobilised to account for and make sense of a very sudden economic col-
lapse. This is particularly significant in this context, we suggest, for two reasons. 
The celebration of history is a striking feature of Icelandic culture, hugely impor-
tant in the country’s negotiations of its independence politically, economically 
and culturally, negotiations which are both internal and external to the country 
itself (see Hastrup 1998; Koester 1990; Árnason et al. 2007). Secondly, the eco-
nomic collapse can be said to have reversed, or at least problematised significantly, 
the trajectory that Icelanders had imagined for their own contemporary history 
as a relatively relentless movement towards an ever brighter future. As such we 
might suggest that the collapse in Iceland occasioned something akin to mourn-
ing in the country as a taken for granted and desired future suddenly seemed lost. 
It is of course stating the blindingly obvious to say that anthropologists have 
long recognised that cultures are historical phenomena. So much has effectively 
been taken for granted in anthropological thinking on culture since Franz Boas 
(see Hatch 1974). The recognition that history is cultural, even the possibility to 
record ‘events’, for wont of a better word here, as history, is more recent, albeit not 
so recent any more. What we seek to add to these insights is an insistence that the 
cultural construction of history can be usefully examined from the perspective of 
rhetoric. In this we draw on work on rhetoric and culture pursued by anthropolo-
gist Michael Carrithers (Carrithers 2009a, 2009b; see Strecker, Tyler 2009). The 
events leading up to, around and following the collapse in Iceland, the questions 
that surround them, or perhaps more accurately the answers that people seek to 
provide to them, we suggest, amount to what Carrithers (2009a: 34) has called 
items of rhetoric. These are items evoked, mobilised and employed as people seek 
to convince self and others of the causes of the collapse and the lessons to be learnt 
from it. To explicate this further, we will discuss culture and rhetoric briefly before 
moving onto history in Iceland. 
Culture and rhetoric
Carrithers (2009a, 2009b) has argued forcefully that anthropologists should pay 
serious attention to rhetoric when seeking to understand how people make sense 
of their past and indeed the future. Moreover, Carrithers maintains that focus on 
rhetoric is crucial in furthering anthropological analysis and understanding of 
culture more generally. For Carrithers rhetoric refers to the processes of convinc-
ing self and others, for example of the view that Iceland did indeed suffer an eco-
nomic and moral collapse in autumn 2008. Key here is obviously the attention to 
convincing as a process, the underlying argument being that this process, aimed at 
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18 Sigurjón B. Hafsteinsson, Tinna Grétarsdóttir, Arnar Árnason
both self and others, is a hugely important aspect of social life. An important ele-
ment of attending to rhetoric, according to Carrithers (2009b), is to acknowledge 
the directionality of much of human action. Of crucial significance here is the 
idea of ‘addressivity’ that Carrithers (2009b: 7) borrows from Mikhail Bakhtin. To 
speak of addressivity is to highlight the way in which human actions – spoken and 
unspoken alike – are frequently, if not necessarily always, directed at another per-
son or persons. It might be added that through self-talk such actions are indeed 
often enough directed at self as well. 
This element of addressivity is certainly clearly evident in much of the material 
that we will present here. In seeking the causes of the collapse in Iceland and in 
proposing a path to a better future, the material we analyse is clearly addressed 
to an audience, even as that audience is often enough rather diffuse and mostly 
imagined rather than physically present. This material, we contend, is clearly in-
tended to affect, to make a movement and lead to a performance, to adjust James 
Fernandez’s phrase slightly (see Carrithers 2009b: 7). It has a rhetorical edge as 
Carrithers has put it (2009b: 6). 
Carrithers (2009b: 3–6) stresses that rhetoric always takes place in a context. 
That is to say, there is not a universal logic according to which rhetoric operates 
always and everywhere. Rather, particular tropes, particular metaphors or narra-
tives are particularly powerful within a culture, a term Carrithers uses hesitantly. 
Culture in this view offers a set of tools that are then put to rhetorical use in the 
process whereby people seek to convince self or others, and through that to move 
them to action. We could mention here quickly, for example how the story of hav-
ing succumbed to foreign rule, and the importance of avoiding that happening 
again, resonates powerfully with most Icelanders. Or indeed how the trope of for-
eign exploitation, and again the importance of avoiding that fate, has a rhetorical 
edge to most people in Iceland. Metaphors drawn from working on sea are also 
important and powerful as we will have occasion to come back to later. 
We wish to draw one further insight from Carrithers’ work. In recent years 
Carrithers (2009a) has explored the theme of collapsing moral orders and their 
recreation in particular with reference to post-war and then post-unification Ger-
many. Carrithers discusses specifically the importance of overcoming the past 
(Vergangenheitsbewältigung in German) “as a new item of rhetoric” (2009a: 34) 
that appeared first in West Germany in the 1950s. This, he adds, is in a global 
perspective an “unusual understanding of nationalist history” (2009a: 34) – an 
insight we would like to take a moment to consider. Of course nationalist history, 
wherever it is found, more commonly celebrates the past and either insists on the 
present as the logical, inevitable and welcome unfolding of or as a failure to live 
up to that very past. In the references to ‘Old Iceland’ and ‘New Iceland’ in the 
material we will later analyse, and to the struggle to ensure the victory of the latter 
over the former, we see a rhetoric similar to the Vergangenheitsbewältigung which 
Carrithers describes for post-war Germany. Th
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19The uses and abuses of the past: cultural rhetoric and the unmaking…
In what follows we will first discuss the cultural construction of history in Ice-
land. We then describe the efforts in Iceland to understand the causes of the col-
lapse of 2008. We treat the accounts given as rhetoric, as attempts to convince self 
and others of a particular view of events. We then describe briefly how these echo 
in many ways the accounts that were given to explain the rapid economic expan-
sion in Iceland prior to the collapse and the then seemingly boundless prosper-
ity. From that we discuss how attempts to move from the ‘Old Iceland’ and build 
a ‘New Iceland’ draw on these accounts, how the rhetoric is to move to action. We 
suggest that a certain irony is embedded, as a fundamental aspect of the rhetoric 
serves to convince people of the continuing identification with the ‘nation-form’ 
(Berlant 1998) that was so important in legitimating the politics of economic ex-
pansion (see Árnason et al. 2003, 2004).
Methods and ethnographic context
Over the last ten years we have been engaged in research into changing regimes of 
death and grief in Iceland. We have carried out extensive fieldwork in the country 
over that time, conducted numerous interviews and analysed public documents 
and discussions of relevance to the issues of death and grief. While this experience 
informs the current work, in this paper we focus mostly on and draw our material 
from public discussions, and debates in particular, as these have been carried out 
in the various media forms in Iceland. We have examined newspaper articles and 
commentaries, comments placed on the internet versions of the same newspa-
pers, radio and television news and debates. Additionally our analysis is informed 
by our ongoing research experience in Iceland, our participation in everyday dis-
cussions about the collapse in particular and state of affairs in Iceland in general. 
Culture and history in Iceland
The anthropological literature on the relationship between culture and history is 
of course vast and for the most part well beyond the remit of this paper. That the 
understanding of history is culturally constructed, and hence variable, even that 
the possibility of understanding the world in terms of history rests on particular 
cultural assumptions rather than universal conditions, is by now a painfully ob-
vious observation (see Sahlins 1985). It is well established in the ethnographic 
record that history occupies a hugely important place public life in Iceland (see for 
example Hastrup 1998; Koester 1990). This is of course not history as a succession 
of events, but rather structured or plotted history, where particular events take on 
significance because of their relation to other events preceding or following them; 
because, that is, of their place in the plot. Thus according to Hastrup, Iceland’s 
history is in public discussions and reflections on the past and the future of the 
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20 Sigurjón B. Hafsteinsson, Tinna Grétarsdóttir, Arnar Árnason
‘nation’, often divided up into three different and distinct periods or epochs. This 
division in turn has been the basis on which history has been taught in Icelandic 
schools and as such it is the familiar and unmarked background against which 
current events in Iceland are often cast (Hastrup 1998: 26). 
Following Hastrup (1998: 26) we can say that this story begins with the age 
of the settlement, generally understood to run roughly from 874 AD to 1262. 
This period is frequently presented as a kind of paradise, certainly the golden 
past of Iceland. During this time the hero Vikings glorified in the Saga, are said 
to have fled the encroaching tyranny of the King of Norway in order to be able 
to live freely, an account echoed of course by Mr Hattersley in the excerpt above. 
This is the time during which Iceland was an independent commonwealth, free 
and prosperous. This golden past, according to Hastrup, was then lost, like so 
many Paradises are. The responsibility for this turn of events is variously placed 
on foreign interference, specifically the desire of the King of Norway to extend his 
dominion to Iceland, and internal strife as local chieftains fought for supremacy, 
often enough appealing to said King for assistance. The upshot was that Iceland 
eventually became part of the Danish realm. The period after this is presented as 
the ‘Dark Ages’ (Hastrup 1998: 27) in Iceland. The centuries of Danish rule are 
generally thought of in Iceland as a time of humiliation and extreme hardship. It is 
a time when the very future of nation, its language and culture and even its simple 
physical survival, was seen as being repeatedly in serious danger. The third age of 
Iceland’s history, according to Hastrup, is the post-Independence period. This is 
the time when paradise has been regained as political sovereignty is seen to lead 
to cultural and economic prosperity. This is the bright future “seen as a period of 
progress”, to quote Hastrup (1998: 26) again, “of increasing technological sophis-
tication and wealth”.
This epoch reached its height in the economic boom in Iceland during the 
years leading to the collapse, the early 2000s. The period of growth is related to 
a process known in Iceland as útrás. In ordinary parlance útrás means release of 
sorts: release for excessive energy, for emotions, needs and desires for example 
(see Árnason et al. 2004). But here it refers specifically to the foreign economic 
expansion, if not conquest, of Icelanders. Its opposite, innrás, means invasion, 
usually meaning military invasion (see also Helgason 2006). During this period, 
figures of speech such as ‘incursion’, (strandhögg) ‘go Viking’, (í víking) and ‘gain-
ing ground on foreign shores’ (landvinningar) were used widely by politicians, 
entrepreneurs, the media and others addressing Icelanders’ participation in the 
new global economy (see Ásmundsson et al. 2011). Well known British high street 
concerns and iconic Danish enterprises were bought by Icelandic businessmen, 
acquisitions that were spoken of in the terms of Viking raids. The three large Ice-
landic banks all opened branches outside of Iceland. This process of expansion is 
central to what Icelanders refer to as útrás. 
The útrás of Icelandic businesses was accompanied by speculation and expla-
nation. How was the expansion possible? Where did the money come from? In 
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21The uses and abuses of the past: cultural rhetoric and the unmaking…
the UK and Denmark rumours of Russian mafia funding were rife, fuelled by the 
fact that some of the most prominent entrepreneurs made their money initially by 
brewing ale in St. Petersburg. In Iceland the explanations tended to be congratu-
latory, celebratory even though it is right to keep in mind here that many of the 
main media outlets in the country were for some of this time owned by some of 
the more important business players themselves. The main reason provided for 
what was seen as spectacular success is contained within the word used to refer 
to these businessmen: útrásarvíkingar, Vikings of the foreign expansion. This was 
no mere decoration, as we have already hinted at above. The success of Icelan-
dic businessmen was seen to lie in a characteristic shared with, and perpetuated 
from the time of, their supposed Viking ancestors, in much the same way as Mr 
Hattersley suggested humorously. Quick thinking, decisiveness and courage were 
abilities attributed to the útrásarvíkingar whose activities were likened to Viking 
raids (strandhögg), on unsuspecting foreign shores. Of course this was to some 
extent propaganda promoted by the entrepreneurs themselves through their me-
dia outlets. But it was propaganda that had impact, a rhetorical edge because of 
the cultural context it played upon and in. During fieldwork in the summer of 
2007, just over a year before the collapse, people routinely told us that wherever 
the money might have come from in the first place, these businessmen clearly had 
qualities for running businesses that set them apart from their foreign colleagues. 
Such was the success they were evidently having. Official discourse promoted the 
same ideas. The president of Iceland repeatedly made statements to this effect in 
his numerous speeches. Thus addressing a history conference in 2006 the presi-
dent asserted that útrásin had deep roots in the history of the nation. Similarly an 
official report into the ‘Image of Iceland’, published in 2008 before the hrun makes 
similar links. The report makes frequent references to alleged Icelandic qualities 
of diligence (dugnaður), optimism, (bjartsýni), courage (áræðni), power (kraftur), 
and purity (hreinleiki). The report talks about a small nation seeking freedom and 
independence (frelsisleitlítillarþjóðar) (Icelandic Prime Minister’s Office 2008; see 
also Sagnfræðingafélagið 2008). The report claims further that Icelanders have an 
indomitable ‘can do spirit’ and that they tend to be convinced that everything will 
work out, all treddist as the common Icelandic phrase goes. 
While the entrepreneurs themselves, their media outlets, their political sup-
porters and indeed official reports all linked the successes of Icelandic business-
men to particular historically rooted qualities of the Icelandic nation, Þorgerður 
Einarsdóttir (2010) has pointed out that the discourses around the expansion in 
Iceland were profoundly gendered. Qualities associated with and celebrated as 
masculine were thus the qualities highlighted as having allowed the economic 
expansion to take place. Thus while officially the ‘whole’ nation was being linked 
to the successes of Icelandic business, the subtext suggested that those successes 
depended on qualities celebrated in men in particular but not in women. 
Other qualities that were emphasized in the report mentioned above, and in 
the public discourses more generally, as specifically Icelandic was the notion of 
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22 Sigurjón B. Hafsteinsson, Tinna Grétarsdóttir, Arnar Árnason
creativity (sköpunargleði) which was often associated to Icelanders’ gift of poetry 
(skáldagáfa). In this context the word athafnaskáld was frequently used. This word 
has two parts: athafna points to actions, athafnamaður (maður is man) being an 
entrepreneur. Skáld is a poet. We emphasise that initially athafnaskáld was used 
very positively to elevate business, or the ‘art of business’, by associating it with the 
status of poetry and writing more generally in Iceland, an association that stretch-
es back to the Sagas and the Eddic poetry. Contemporary ‘Vikings’ were presented 
as ‘poets of útrás’ as indicated in the following headline in the influential Icelandic 
newspaper Morgunblaðið: “The Danish television interviews Icelandic poets of 
útrás” (December 2, 2005). The connotations of athafnaskáld are maybe some-
what more mixed now as skáldskapur also has the meaning fiction in Icelandic. It 
turns out, many would now say, that the útrás was skáldskapur from the hopeful 
start to its bitter finish, a fiction, a fantasy, a deception. 
As many have argued (Grétarsdóttir 2010) útrás was routinely portrayed as 
growing out of the culture, traditions and history of the Icelandic nation. There is 
of course a clear correspondence between this indigenous view, and Roy Hatters-
ley’s analysis. Both rely on a form of essentialism. Here we might ask: what is the 
implication of this with regards to the indigenous view? What is achieved by such 
essentialism? First, it is of course a claim that the successes of the útrásarvíkingar 
were the success of the ‘nation’, that the nation itself was somehow responsible 
for all of this; the qualities that secured success were qualities of the nation rather 
than simply the individuals themselves. The extent to which people could relate 
to the qualities thus portrayed varied widely and we have already noted how gen-
dered the depiction was. However, here we want to highlight another aspect of 
this portrayal. It is of significance here that two of the banks at the heart of the 
expansion were owned by the state until the beginning of this century. A rationale 
for their privatisation was the neo-liberal view that the prosperity of the nation 
would be best secured through individual initiative and enterprise rather than 
businesses run by the ‘dead hand of the state’ as it was often put. The ideology 
on which privatisation rested in a way removed the stake the nation had in eco-
nomic development. The discourse around economic expansion may have served 
to ideologically secure that stake though, establishing a cultural link where and 
when the political and economic link was being undermined. This is a point to 
which we will return. 
Iceland’s inexorable rise, its trajectory to increasing economic prosperity was 
to be met by furthering the country’s political standing. Shortly before the col-
lapse of 2008, Iceland sought a place on the United Nations’ Security Council, 
a clear claim to a place at the centre of the world stage seen as justified in light of 
economic prowess. It is not surprising then that the economic collapse that fol-
lowed required extensive and agonising soul searching, attempts to account for 
what had happened. We turn now to these efforts. Th
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Worlds collapsing
The economic meltdown of Iceland in the autumn of 2008 was, after a short pe-
riod of somewhat panicked bewilderment (see Guðmundur Andri Thorsson in 
Fréttablaðið, 6.10.2008), swiftly followed by intense efforts to account for and 
make sense of what had happened. With that, the recent history of the country 
quickly became subject to sustained scrutiny and debate. The claim was made by 
many, and denied by others, that accompanying, or more accurately preceding the 
financial meltdown in the country, had been an even more profound moral, social 
and political collapse (see for example Geir Rafnsson in Comment is free in “The 
Guardian” 25.10.2008; Guðmundur Andri Thorsson in “Fréttablaðið” 27.10.2008). 
Many observed – publicly in print or more privately in speech – that Icelanders 
had often before faced financial trauma and economic uncertainty either at the 
hand of the harsh environment in which they live, or the vagaries of the interna-
tional markets where they sell their produce. Hardship like that, they would add, 
was nothing new, but rather had been instrumental in making Icelanders who 
they are. However, what the banking crisis and the wider economic collapse that 
followed, revealed was a far more troubling coming asunder of the moral, social 
and political fabric of the country. Indeed, for many commentators the collapse of 
the moral order was in fact the ultimate cause of the economic crisis. It is not sur-
prising then that effort has been put into understanding the causes of the collapse. 
This was indeed the conclusion of the Special Investigation Commission, set up by 
Parliament, into the collapse that reported on the matter in 2010. 
While the report of the Special Investigation Commission (SIC) is an impor-
tant inquiry, its limitations are of particular interest in themselves, as Irma Er-
lingsdóttir (2011) has noted. Firstly, the period that the Commission examined 
was quite short, confined as it was to the years immediately before the collapse. 
That period was hence marked out even here as unusual, as an aberration in the 
history of the nation more widely. The history of the nation more generally was 
not called into question, not deemed problematic. Secondly, no attempts were 
made following the publication of the report to involve Icelanders in general in 
public discussion about the moral and political collapse and the possible recon-
ciliation to follow it (Erlingsdóttir 2011). The Commission, for good reasons of 
course, was drawn from a small and narrow group of experts rather than being 
representative of Icelanders more generally (Erlingsdóttir 2011). 
The attempt to locate precisely, examine and understand the causes of the col-
lapse, has in turn fed even more anguished endeavours to rearticulate and rebuild 
what have been seen as the moral foundations of Icelandic society and the legiti-
macy of its political order. This has been evidenced, for example, in the protracted, 
on-going and intensely controversial efforts to rewrite the country’s constitution, 
and in the debates that have taken place around the office of the President and the 
powers that should properly belong to it. In the effort to rearticulate the moral 
fabric of the country and re-establish the legitimacy of its politics, references have 
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24 Sigurjón B. Hafsteinsson, Tinna Grétarsdóttir, Arnar Árnason
frequently been made to ‘Old Iceland’, the Iceland of the years leading up to the 
collapse. These are almost always accompanied by references to the ‘New Iceland’, 
the Iceland that is perhaps for most still only a hope, and maybe for many not even 
a hope anymore, of a better society that will allow more of its members a better 
life. There has been frequent talk of a struggle, a battle, a war even to bring about 
the New Iceland. And so, the structure of the New Iceland as a melodrama, a min-
imal narrative, or a rhetorical device is inherently optimistic – although perhaps 
it remains to be seen whether that optimism is cruel, in the sense invested in the 
term by Lauren Berlant (2011).
In the Icelandic periodization of their own history, mentioned above, the 
events around the changing ages, if that is not too grandiose a way of putting this, 
take on a particular significance. What was it really that lay behind the settlement 
of Iceland? Who or what was really responsible for Icelanders agreeing to become 
subjects of the King of Norway? Who is it that guided the nation to independ-
ence and hence is best trusted to secure continuing freedom? We suggest that the 
events around hrunið, the collapse, and the linguistic forms of ‘New Iceland’ and 
‘Old Iceland’ have, at least for now, taken on a similar significance in the historical 
imagination in Iceland. In what follows we discuss the different interpretations 
that have been put forward in public discussions in Iceland to explain and account 
for the collapse of the economy and the moral order of Icelandic society in the 
autumn of 2008. We draw a rough distinction between four different explanations 
that have been offered. We emphasise how these different accounts draw rhetori-
cally on history.
The collapse as an externally caused natural disaster
During the first week of October 2008 when the Icelandic banking and financial 
system collapsed it was widely presented domestically as the consequence of ex-
ternal events, the crisis in the global financial system precipitated by the collapse 
of the Lehman’s Brothers Bank. On the 6th of October 2008 “The Guardian” news-
paper, for example, described Iceland as being caught in an ‘economic storm’. This 
was also very clearly the line taken by the Icelandic authorities at this time, in par-
ticular the then prime minister Geir H. Haarde. This was most clearly expressed 
in his televised address to the nation on October the 6th 2008 which concluded 
with the quickly infamous words: ‘God help Iceland’. The language used in this 
context was also revealing. The crisis was presented as holskeifla, a huge wave, de-
picting Iceland as a small boat caught in a storm in the middle of the ocean. This 
language of course draws on historical references to the simultaneous importance 
and danger of fishing for the development of Icelandic society. Here rhetorical 
connotations drawn from Icelandic history are of importance. Unlike most na-
tions Iceland does not have an army and does not celebrate fallen soldiers as na-
tional heroes. The heroes of Iceland’s struggle for independence were poets and 
lawyers. The fallen victims of Iceland’s struggles for survival and prosperity have 
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25The uses and abuses of the past: cultural rhetoric and the unmaking…
tended to be fishermen lost at sea. Around their figure has been drawn together 
both the theme of the struggle of Icelanders in a harsh and dangerous environ-
ment (see Brydon 1996: 7) that fishermen in particular face, and the importance 
of the fishermen’s work in securing the prosperity of the nation. 
Others referred to the crisis as hamfarir. Hamfarir is a complex word that can 
carry the meaning of shape shifting. Extension of that meaning is currently most 
often used to describe an outstanding performance by an athlete. However, the 
other meaning of the term and the one applicable in this context is of a natural 
disaster. Thus the phrase náttúruhamfarir (from náttúra nature and hamfarir) is 
frequently used to talk about such events as volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, ava-
lanches and floods. All are examples of náttúruhamfarir.
What the talk of holskeifla and náttúruhamfarir more generally achieves is 
clearly that it makes Iceland an innocent victim in the financial crisis. We em-
phasise again how this works rhetorically because of the enduring power of the 
story of Icelanders as having long had to cope with and learn to survive in a harsh 
natural environment. The effect here is that the financial crisis is yet another natu-
ral disaster with which Icelanders have long had to deal. The language of natural 
disaster was accepted by many and was prominent, along with exhortations that 
“we all have to stand together against this danger”, in the first weeks after the col-
lapse. It was rejected by some, for example Steingrímur Sigfússon, the leader of 
the then opposition Left-Green-Party, who described the collapse as a man-made 
natural disaster (see “Fréttablaðið” 6.10.2008). 
We want to stay with this issue a little bit longer to focus in on the question of 
intention, agency and responsibility. The prime minister of Iceland in the years 
before the collapse was Geir H. Haarde, mentioned above. He was also the leader 
of the Independence Party, Sjálfstæðisflokkur in Icelandic. This is for the most part 
a relatively broad right wing party, not too different from the British Conservative 
Party for example, that has emphasised the freedom of the individual and been 
the leading party in coalition governments in Iceland for most of the country’s in-
dependence period, including from 1991 until 2009. The emphasis on individual 
freedom became even more pronounced as the party adopted more neo-liberal 
politics from 1991 onwards when individual enterprise was championed as the 
road to economic prosperity for all. A direct and very powerful link was drawn 
here between individual freedom, agency and responsibility, a link very familiar 
from Western political and philosophical thought. This was a link that the party 
emphasised strongly in the run up to parliamentary elections in Iceland in 2007 
when it credited the then apparent economic prosperity in Iceland to the wisdom 
and the actions of its own politicians. This agency and the responsibility that is 
seen to flow from it is precisely what is being denied as the collapse is presented 
as a natural disaster. 
That politicians claim responsibility for prosperity and deny it for a disaster 
is perhaps less than surprising news. Something more is going on here though. 
Following the collapse the Independence Party re-examined its own policies and 
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26 Sigurjón B. Hafsteinsson, Tinna Grétarsdóttir, Arnar Árnason
politics. At the party’s annual convention following the collapse a motion was 
passed to reiterate the policies of the party while suggesting that the collapse had 
been caused by the actions of a few individuals who had abused the economic 
system to quench their own greed. Thus while the party had, according to this, 
created the environment within which individuals could exercise their entrepre-
neurial abilities and aptitudes, the economic catastrophe that followed was caused 
by the actions of a select few individuals, rather than by the environment itself. 
The individuals in question, while not named in the declarations of the party’s 
convention, could clearly be identified in a small country, leaving no doubts about 
who was implicated. They in turn, some of them at least, defended themselves in 
public. They had not intended harm and because of that not caused the economic 
collapse. All they had sought to do was to engage in economic activity profitable 
for themselves and the country as a whole. They, much as anybody, had been 
caught up in a global recession of which they were victims, not authors.
Barbara Johnson (1994) has written on the play of intention between the indi-
vidual and the system. She notes (1994: 46–47) how the identification of particular 
actions as part of misogyny and inequality is almost invariably met by responses 
that locate these actions as individual, ‘private, sophomoric, interpersonally re-
grettable, and isolated’ (1994: 46). That is, what critics point to as systematic and 
institutional is translated into the regrettable individual actions of people who 
either meant no harm because harm was not what they intended (Johnson 1994: 
47), or are ‘a few bad apples’, as the phrase goes, not representative of the institu-
tion as a whole. To mean something here is to intend it, to hold it as a conscious 
deliberate intention. Jokes may be told that play on gender stereotypes but intend 
no harm and as they intend no harm cannot be construed as misogyny. This of 
course assumes that individuals ordinarily have full control over their actions, 
that they author or intend them, and would seem to suggest that people can only 
be held responsible for the actions they fully intend. If a joke I tell to be funny 
causes harm but it had not been my intention in telling the joke to cause harm, 
then I should not be held responsible for that harm. Johnson (1994: 46–47) notes 
that the ‘resistance to recognizing misogyny as institutional is the same resistance 
as the resistance to questioning individual intention and control in language.’ This 
captures accurately how a political party that has claimed institutional respon-
sibility for prosperity through its extending the reach of individual agency and 
responsibility, in turn seeks to deny individual agency – the collapse was caused 
by external ‘natural events’ – or to locate that agency and responsibility with a few 
‘bad apples’, individuals not representative of the party itself. 
This play of intention, action and responsibility is clear in how both The In-
dependence Party and the individual entrepreneurs sought to account for their 
relationship with and responsibility for the economic collapse in Iceland. Such 
a play is further evident in the second explanation we describe. Th
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27The uses and abuses of the past: cultural rhetoric and the unmaking…
The collapse as caused by British and other foreign actions against Iceland
Soon after the collapse another interpretation gained ground, an interpretation 
that does not necessarily go entirely against the first one, an interpretation that has 
since resurfaced around the issue of Icesave and the possible entry of Iceland in the 
European Union. According to this account the actions of the British government 
that caused the hrun, or at least made it much worse than it otherwise would have 
been. The particular actions in question relate to the freezing of Icelandic assets 
in the UK immediately following the collapse of the three Icelandic banks (see, 
for example, “The Independent” 9.10.2008; “Morgunblaðið” 22.10.2008). It was 
claimed, for example, by a number of commentators in Iceland, some of whom 
had the vested interest of having been involved in the running of the bank, that 
this had led directly to the collapse of the largest of the Icelandic banks, Kaupþing, 
which otherwise would have survived. 
The freezing of Icelandic assets in Britain was widely condemned in Iceland. It 
was seen as a grave betrayal of what was supposedly a ‘friendly nation’. What riled 
in particular was the use here of British legislation aimed primarily, but not ex-
clusively, at targeting funding for terrorist activities (“Morgunblaðið” 22.10.2008). 
This portrayal struck a chord with people in Iceland who took to the internet in 
great numbers to seemingly playfully attempt to convince Gordon Brown and 
Alastair Darling of their innocence of any involvement with terrorism (see “Frét-
tablaðið” 22.10.2008). Many of the photographs posted displayed blond and blue 
eyed Icelanders and were accompanied by a rhetorical question: “Mr Brown, do 
I look like a terrorist?” The likely unintended but very clear undertone is of course 
deeply racist, that terrorists look different from us. More recently the President 
of Iceland has sought to turn the tables on the previous British Government by 
claiming that it was Mr Brown himself, rather than Icelanders, who was the ter-
rorist, having committed an act of financial terrorism against the Icelandic na-
tion (see http://www.visir.is/-ummaeli-gordon-brown-voru-fjarmalalegt-hrydju-
verk-/article/2013131219000).
In the initial discussions regarding British involvement in the hrun, some sug-
gested that in this Britain sought revenge for the cod wars of the twentieth cen-
tury. Others interpreted British actions as attempted imperial domination and 
colonial exploitation, re-evoking of course a period of Icelandic history that still 
resonates powerfully even if the colonial master was a different one. This inter-
pretation came to the fore in the intense debates around the Icesave debt and the 
question of whether Iceland had to pay that debt. While Mr Hattersley somewhat 
jokingly sees the resistance to pay as another case of age old Viking thievery, many 
in Iceland expressed the notion that they were being unfairly bullied by a former 
world power still blinded by its prior position in the world. In these accounts 
where responsibility for Iceland’s misfortune is placed at foreign doors, agency 
and responsibility is being located outside of Iceland. Again Iceland is depict-
ed here essentially as a victim, perhaps not of natural disasters but rather of the 
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28 Sigurjón B. Hafsteinsson, Tinna Grétarsdóttir, Arnar Árnason
harmful intentions of others, even as remarkably little reflection was offered on 
how people of such endeavour and courage, as they had been depicted in celebra-
tions of útrásin, could suddenly become such hapless victims. 
However, as time passed the interpretations of the causes of the collapse in 
Iceland increasingly started to point towards private, albeit Icelandic, bankers as 
the culprits. That is, the interpretation in this context was that Icelandic bankers 
might be at fault but that they were at fault as individuals rather than as rep-
resentatives of the Iceland nation, which should then not have to foot the bill. 
Many accounts along this line were at odds with the previous emphasis on the 
nationality of the bankers before the hrun, when considerable effort was made 
by many, the President of Iceland not least, to explain their then apparent success 
with reference to their specifically Icelandic qualities, often portrayed as existing 
as unbroken chain of qualities from the Viking era, as we have already discussed. 
Losing touch with real valuables as the cause of the collapse, 
losing touch with Icelandic values as the cause of the collapse
Some commentators in Iceland, and indeed individuals in private discussions, 
placed the blame for the collapse, at least partly, with the move away from what 
they would describe as the ‘real’ economy in Iceland. The influential commentator 
Guðmundur Andri Thorsson noted for example in one of his regular columns in 
“Fréttablaðið”, that the seeds of the collapse were sown the moment the produc-
tion of real valuables gave way to speculation in intangibles. When fishing quotas, 
the right to fish in other words, became more valuable than the fish caught or the 
ships used to catch them, Icelanders lost sight of the real valuables of economic 
production and lost themselves in speculation. Implicit, and indeed sometimes 
explicit, in this interpretation was the suggestion that the hard work of farming 
and fishing was somehow linked to the essence of what it is to be Icelandic and 
that this connection had been lost. This echoes earlier fears, discussed for exam-
ple by Inga Dóra Björnsdóttir (1989), about the disappearance of distinctive Ice-
landic identity through participation in global economic and political processes. 
The teaching of economics and business at the University of Iceland was in some 
cases singled out here as responsible for having further fostered this turn towards 
speculation.
Other commentators claimed that Icelanders had not so much lost sight of real 
valuables and their production, but rather real Icelandic values. Thus the rapid 
economic expansion before the collapse was said to have undermined funda-
mentally the sense and value of equality and egalitarianism that had previously 
characterised Icelandic society. Others emphasised the ideal of cooperation that 
had been lost in the profound individualisation of worth they saw as having ac-
companied the neo-liberalisation of the Icelandic economy, politics and indeed 
society since 1991. Still others spoke about how a certain traditional Icelandic 
down-to-earthness had been replaced by exaggerated and exuberant ostentatious-
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29The uses and abuses of the past: cultural rhetoric and the unmaking…
ness. Examples would be taken of previous generations when the ideal had been 
the creation rather than the showing off of wealth. 
Greed and corruption as the cause of the collapse
Even so, gradually the most powerful interpretation of events was the one that 
emphasised greed and corruption as the main causes of the collapse of the Ice-
landic economy. In this view, then, a moral collapse in Iceland predated and pre-
cipitated the economic collapse. This remains a powerful interpretation although 
it is clearly and understandably debated. In the still intensely party political – in 
the most ordinary sense of that phrase –the future is very much being decided by 
the writing of the history of the collapse. It varies here somewhat who precisely is 
termed greedy. In some accounts it is primarily the bankers and other business-
men who amassed vast fortunes that to many now appear entirely ill gotten. That 
is, driven by greed and devoid of the business acumen they were previously cele-
brated for, these businessmen amassed their wealth through deception and thiev-
ery, effectively robbing the banks from the inside. In other accounts politicians 
and the occasional public servant are included in this depiction. Politicians stand 
accused of receiving financial support to feed their political ambitions and the 
interests of their parties from the very businesses that have been denounced for 
their greed and corruption. Public servants stand accused, and in one case have 
been convicted, of using their inside knowledge of the state of the banking system 
for personal gain. On some occasions commentators seek to stress the complicity 
of the Icelandic nation in this. The general public was more than happy to par-
ticipate in the ‘party’ during the financial boom, borrowing money when money 
was cheap to spend on what must essentially be regarded as luxuries, some say. 
Again, the emphasis here is on how a much more fundamental moral collapse led 
to an economic meltdown. The charge of corruption is in some ways even more 
profound. Thus many commentators, most famously perhaps former newspaper 
editor and influential member of the Independence Party, Styrmir Gunnarsson, 
have claimed that corruption was the root cause of the collapse. The sources of 
what happened were moral, social and political rather than economic. 
Fundamentally the corruption is understood as involving the unhealthy bed 
sharing of politics, business and public service. Examples are given of favours ex-
tended to particular businesses or even particular businessmen, for instance the 
decisions made in selling the two privatised national banks in 2003. The case has 
been made by some that in many instances deals were essentially done within The 
Independence Party and the Progressive Party that tend to include key members 
government, business and bureaucracy within their folds. In this way commen-
tators would sometimes single out a specific kind of political corruption, that 
here was a case of dirty deals being done to benefit a chosen few in a way known 
through cases of political corruption everywhere. In this interpretation, politicians 
and, in too many cases public servants also, are suspected of acting to further their 
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own individual (or at best some other special) interests. Others sought to place the 
phenomenon more firmly within the particulars of Icelandic society, pointing out 
the difficulty of avoiding a certain amount of bed sharing in a small society where 
everyone knows everyone, as the somewhat exaggerated claim goes. Rather than 
the problem being the corrupt dealings between members of a political party, the 
unease here centres around the difficulty of ensuring proper process when the key 
participants are childhood friends, kin, neighbours, sporting team mates, univer-
sity buddies or some combination of all these. Perhaps this latter worry fuelled 
the calls and the compulsion for ethical guidelines to be established to govern and 
guide conduct in numerous different walks of life in Iceland, calls that were loud 
and clear in the immediate aftermath of the collapse but have perhaps become less 
vocal since then.
Conclusion: the rhetoric of New Iceland, Old Iceland
When work on this paper started it appeared that the moral and political collapse 
of Icelandic society had been largely accepted as the interpretation of events. In 
the time that the paper has been in writing this has somewhat changed. Rhetoric 
which claims that the collapse was, in effect, the work of a few rogue individuals is 
back in vogue although it remains hugely contested. To these claims it is frequent-
ly added that the problems have been exacerbated in large part by the inept efforts 
of the government that came to power after the collapse, a government that some 
depict as having been all too willing to place foreign interests higher than Icelan-
dic ones. Claims of betrayal, of treachery, have surfaced in relation to Iceland’s 
application to join the European Union. These claims echo through the historical 
connection, rhetorically achieved, with the subjection to the King of Norway in 
1262. As we write, Icelanders are stuck in an extremely protracted and controver-
sial process of adopting a new constitution, a process that now in fact seems to 
have come to a halt. The new constitution is seen by its supporters as the neces-
sary and minimum requirement for the establishment of a ‘New Iceland’ that the 
collapse called for. A new constitution was the key demand by the protestors who 
drove the government that presided over the collapse from office in early 2009. 
Following the appointment of a new government extensive work was carried out 
to write a new constitution. Dedicated attempts were made to move that process 
out of the hands of politicians and involve the ‘nation’ in that process. Thus a ‘na-
tional gathering’, Þjóðfundur, was called as key step in that process. Þjóðfundur, 
simply as a term, has deep echoes from the Icelandic struggle for independence 
and helped feed the optimism about ‘New Iceland’ that a new constitution was to 
help bring into being. However the making of new constitution was effectively 
blocked by the opposition in Parliament and thus Iceland still has the constitution 
that many saw as deeply compromised by the collapse. 
The optimism around the construction of New Iceland that many felt follow-
ing the collapse has perhaps not turned out to be cruel, but has certainly largely 
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faded. Rhetorical evocation of history has achieved the distribution of agency and 
responsibilities in such a way that increasingly people seem to accept that the col-
lapse was caused by foreign forces and individual greed. That there was anything 
systematically wrong in Iceland is an account increasingly under attack. This has 
been achieved rhetorically by links with Icelandic history, and by the rendering of 
agency as individual intention. 
In this paper we have suggested two things. We have argued that the cultural 
construction of history is essential in understanding how people in Iceland have 
sought to make sense of the collapse of 2008. These accounts, we have argued, are 
informed by how history is culturally structured in Iceland. The collapse took on 
the significance it had, we have suggested, of course because of the economic im-
pact it had on people’s lives, but also because of how it fundamentally problema-
tized the trajectory of history Icelanders had imagined for themselves and their 
country. The inexorable march to progress, economic, cultural and political, that 
had been tied to independence, and that the spectacular economic growth in the 
years before the collapse had seemed to reinforce, was suddenly reversed sharply. 
Second, we have suggested that the idea of rhetoric is helpful in understanding 
how people make sense of and account for their history. That accounting, we sug-
gest following Carrithers, has to do with convincing self and others because his-
tory is so often fundamentally tied to people’s projections of the future. What 
the rhetorical evocation of history has achieved, we have argued, is to allocate 
responsibility either to external forces outside the control of Iceland and Iceland-
ers, or to locate them to specific rogue individuals. The possibility that Icelandic 
history more broadly than simply the years running up to the collapse, might be 
suspect is dismissed. The idea that there was something systematically deficient 
in the country is effectively dismissed too. By this the continuing and celebratory 
identification with the ‘nation-form’ (Berlant 1998) is secured, drawing on the 
very same rhetorically structured narratives as were mobilised to celebrate the 
economic expansion in the first place. 
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